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The Case for Expanded Illinois
Insurance Producer Duties
MICHAEL SCHAG °

I. THE CLIMATE FOR COMPLAINT

Insurance companies rely heavily on insurance producers' to market
and sell their products. Yet, in a 1992 Gallup poll, forty-one percent of
respondents rated the honesty and ethical standards of insurance salespeople
as "low" or "very low."2 Of the occupations tested, insurance salespeople
out-paced only car salespeople who are apparently mistrusted by fifty-nine
percent of the population. 3 Lawyers, in comparison, fared better than
insurance salespeople with only thirty-six percent of the respondents 4rating
the honesty and ethical standards of lawyers as "low" or "very low."
Contact with an insurance producer is unavoidable for most people.
Few individuals or businesses escape the need for insurance coverage. In
the United States, 366 million life insurance policies worth $10.4 trillion
were in force in 1992. 5 In addition, in 1992, property and casualty

* B.S., University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana; J.D., Oklahoma City University;
Attorney, Department of the Air Force; Asst. Professor of Aviation Law, Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University.
1. The term "producer" is used throughout this article in reference to the insurance
salesperson. Although the term "agent" and "broker" still enjoy common use, the
terminology has been abandoned by the Illinois legislature. Thus, "producer" is now the
proper term of art. Furthermore, the use of "producer" eliminates confusion when discussing
agency law because the term "agent" has a more diverse meaning in common insurance
industry vernacular, often generically describing anyone who sells insurance regardless of the
identity of the principal. Cf. 215 ILCS 5/491.1(b) (1993) with Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 73 para.
1065.37 (1979) (repealed).
2. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll 118 (1992).
3. See id.
4. See id. For works demonstrating that public disdain for lawyers crosses national
boundaries, see generally JOSEPH MICHAEL, LAWYERS CAN SERIOUSLY DAMAGE YOUR
HEALTH (1984) (addressing the lawyer's role in England); ALFRED PHILLIPS, THE LAWYER

AND SOCIETY (1987) (addressing the lawyer's role in England and Scotland).

5. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1994 534, Table No. 828 (114th ed. 1994).
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insurance companies collect approximately $227.5 billion in premiums, 6
while health insurance companies collected $116.4 billion in premiums in
1991.7 Perhaps the public's disdain for insurance producers is an unavoidable incident of their business. After all, insurance producers force people
to contemplate their mortality and visualize the catastrophic occurrences of
life.
Traditionally, the law has placed certain duties and liabilities on the
producer; however, these have been limited to particular circumstances.
Although the purchase of insurance coverage remains a confusing endeavor
for most people, the law has been slow to respond to the public's reliance
upon the producer's knowledge and skill. For most people, the insurance
producer is the consumer's sole source of information and advice concerning
proper coverage. Nevertheless, the great weight of current law governing
insurance sales practices fails to impose affirmative duties to inquire and
advise. Instead, the consumer is left to bear the risk of an insufficient
insurance needs analysis. Thus, producers tout their supposed ability to
provide comprehensive financial planning while, at the same time, remaining
virtually unaccountable for the advice they offer consumers. The result is
anomalous because the producer is in a better position to ensure that the
consumer is apprised of pertinent insurable interests. The time has come for
the legislature and courts to recognize the reality of insurance industry
dynamics by conferring on the producer affirmative duties to adequately
inquire about consumer needs and properly advise insurance purchasers.
II.

THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Typically, insurance producer liability is based on one or a combination
of agency, contract, and tort theory.' Often, a cognizable cause of action
under contract and tort theory arises, from the same facts. An action based
on agency theory, however, requires a careful analysis of the producer's
fiduciary relationship with the insured and the peculiarities of the so-called
dual agency of the producer.

6. See id. at 535, Table No. 830.
7. See id. at 534, Table No. 829.
8. See infra notes 9-39 and accompanying text.
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A. LIABILITY BASED ON TORT AND CONTRACT

1. The Marriage of Two Theories
In order to establish the producer's liability based on contract, the
plaintiff must present a prima facie case demonstrating that (1) the plaintiff
proposed to be insured; (2) the producer agreed to procure insurance; (3) the
subject, period, amount, and rate of insurance were ascertained or understood; and (4) the premium was paid if it was demanded. 9
The insurance producer's liability based on tort is established with the
traditional prima facie case for negligence.' ° The plaintiff must prove that
the producer breached a duty of care owed to the client and this breach
damaged the client." Generally, the producer's conduct is measured by a
reasonable care standard. 12 One Illinois appellate court which described
the duty of care stated that a producer "is obligated to act in good faith and
with reasonable care, skill and diligence in transacting business for the
insured."'3 The Illinois formulation is representative of others found
among sister state jurisdictions.14 In addition, another Illinois appellate

9. See Clear-Vu Packaging, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 434 N.E.2d 365, 368
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (expressly stating that a producer's liability is viably premised on either
tort or contract theory). See also Scarsdale Villas Assocs. v. Korman Assocs. Ins. Agency,
533 N.E.2d 81, 83 (Il. App. Ct. 1988); Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 208 N.E.2d 12, 18-19 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1965).
10. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
11. Id.
12. See infra note 14.
13. Omar v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 529 N.E.2d 686, 690 (111.
App. Ct. 1988).
14. See Bell v. O'Leary, 744 F.2d 1370, 1372 (8th Cir. 1984) (requiring the producer
to use "reasonable care, skill, and diligence"); Fli-Back Co. v. Philadelphia Mfrs. Mut. Ins.
Co., 502'F.2d, 214, 216-217 (4th Cir. 1974) (requiring producers to employ "reasonable
diligence"); Port Clyde Foods, Inc. v. Holiday Syrups, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (requiring producers to use "skill, care, and diligence"); McKinnon v. Batte, 485 So.
2d 295, 297 (Miss. 1986) (quoting Security Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cox, 299 So. 2d 192, 194
(Miss. 1974)) (requiring the producer to apply "that degree of diligence and care with
reference thereto which a reasonably prudent [person] would exercise in the transaction of
his own business"); Mayo v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 192 S.E.2d 828, 832 (N.C. 1972)
(requiring producers to use "reasonable diligence"); Riddle-Duckworth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 171
S.E.2d 486, 490 (S.C. 1969) (requiring producers to use "due care"); State Farm Life Ins. Co.
v. Fort Wayne Nat'l Bank, 474 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. C. App. 1985) (requiring the producer
to utilize "the skill, knowledge, diligence and care ordinarily exercised in the insurance
industry"). Cf. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Burnette, 560 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (quoting Cateora v. British At. Assurance, 282 F. Supp. 167, 174 (S.D. Tex. 1968))
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court elaborated by indicating that local custom may influence the applicable
standard of care.'"
Of course, the essence of a negligence analysis is in the detail of what
errors and omissions constitute a violation of the duty of care. Commonly,
lawsuits are based on both contract and tort theory,16 but courts do not
always clearly delineate whether the ultimate determination of liability is
based on contract or tort theory. 7 Regardless, articulating the proper
theory is a weighty pleading problem because the theory underlying a
lawsuit can determine potential plaintiffs.' 8 Under contract theory, the
intended beneficiary of the policy proceeds is usually the plaintiff. 19 Under
tort theory, however, the insurance producer defendant may have to contend
with the insured's estate in addition to intended beneficiaries. 20 Nevertheless, a comprehensive survey of the opinions reveals a predictable pattern
of duties plausibly arising under either theory.
2. Conduct Resulting in Liability
The most common conduct which results in liability is the producer's
failure to fulfill the duty to procure insurance coverage. 2 , Remarkably,
ascertaining whether the duty to procure insurance arises under contract or

(stating that an insurance salesperson "owes his clients the greatest possible duty" seemingly
indicating that an insurance salesperson may be held to a standard even more rigid than
ordinary care).
15. See Lee v. Calfa, 528 N.E.2d 336, 341 (III. App. Ct. 1988) (stating the standard
of care in terms of knowledge and skill possessed by well-qualified agents in Lake County
or similar localities).
16. See, e.g., Omar v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 529 N.E.2d 686 (III. App. Ct.
1988).
17. See, e.g., Cummings Foods, Inc. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 439 N.E.2d 37, 42 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1982) (recognizing the court's own failure to draw a clear distinction).
18. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 81 (1988).
19. Id. at 81.
20. Id. See, e.g., Rosin v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 116 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1960); Duffie v. Bankers' Life Assoc., 139 N.W. 1087 (Iowa 1913).
21. See, e.g., Shultz v. Griffin-Rahn Ins. Agency, 550 N.E.2d 232, 234 (Il. App. Ct.
1990) (stating that a broker's primary duties are to faithfully negotiate and procure insurance
policies). See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. Cf. Pickett v. First Am. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 412 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (III. App. Ct. 1980) (holding the savings and loan
association liable for failure to procure insurance where, while acting as an agent for the
borrower, it collected and held payments earmarked for the purchase of credit insurance
which demonstrates that the plaintiffs cause of action is strengthened by the agent's
collection and holding of payments pending insurance coverage acquisition).
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tort law is often a thorny theoretical conundrum;22 however, Illinois courts
have been equally receptive to either characterization.2 3 Nevertheless, it
is important to distinguish between a contract to procure insurance and a
contract to insure. A contract to procure insurance does not render the
promisor an insurer, although comparative liability exposure may result if
the promisor fails to procure the agreed-upon insurance.24
With respect to the failure to procure insurance, two scenarios dominate
existing case law. Many cases involve an insurance policy that has been
issued but is somehow deficient with respect to the scope of coverage
originally agreed upon.25 Other cases involve the producer's failure to
procure any coverage at all.26 Furthermore, encompassed in the duty to
procure insurance are two sub-duties.2 First, the producer must fulfill the
duty to procure insurance with promptness. 28 As Joseph Addison once
29
wrote, "There is nothing more requisite in business than dispatch."
Unreasonable delay in procuring appropriate insurance can result in liability
if damages arise from the producer's negligent conduct. 30 Secondly, the
producer must seasonably notify the proposed insured if the insurer denies
the application for coverage." Violation of either sub-duty results in grave
liability exposure where the proposed insured urgently needs replacement
coverage before the expiration of a prior policy's coverage. 2
Perhaps the most easily avoided area of insurance procurement lawsuit

22. See, e.g., Clear-Vu Packaging, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 434 N.E.2d
365 (I11.App. Ct. 1982); Black v. Illinois Fair Plan Assoc., 409 N.E.2d 549 (I1l. App. Ct.
1980).
23. Id.
24. See Zettel v. Paschen Contractors, 427 N.E.2d 189, 191-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(recognizing the distinction between a contract to procure insurance and a contract to insure).
25. See generally Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Liability Insurance or Broker on
Ground of Inadequacy of Life, Health, and Accident Insurance Coverage Procured, 72
A.L.R. 735 (1976); Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Liability of Insurance Agent or Broker on
Ground of Inadequacy of Liability Insurance Coverage Procured, 72 A.L.R.3d 704 (1976);
Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Liability of Insurance Agent or Broker on Ground of
Inadequacy of Property Insurance Coverage Procured, 72 A.L.R.3d 747 (1976).
26. See generally Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Liability of Insurance Broker of
Agent to Insured for Failure to Procure Insurance, 64 A.L.R.3d 398 (1975).
27. See Lake County Grading Co. v. Great Lakes Agency, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 1128, 1132
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
28. Id.

29. JOSEPH ADDISON, DIALOGUES UPON THE USEFULNESS OF ANCIENT MEDALS in
THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOSEPH ADDISON 5 (George Forman ed., 1811).
30. See Talbot v. Country Life Ins. Co., 291 N.E.2d 830, 832 (III. App. Ct. 1973).
31. See Lake County Grading Co., 589 N.E.2d at 1132.
32. See Trenker, supra note 26.
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proliferation involves simple misunderstandings between a producer and a
client resulting from a producer's imprecise and sweeping language. For
example, in practice a producer often assures his client that he will "take
Such broad assurances often create consumer
care of everything."
expectations that would not have existed had the producer been more precise
in his dealings. Inevitably, lawsuits result.33 While the insureds' lawsuits
are not always successful,34 prudent producers will, nonetheless, seek to
avoid such lawsuits. Consequently, the producer should balance salesmanship with an appropriate degree of candor. Rather than engage in broad
assurances, the producer should take care to delineate exactly what his
efforts will accomplish for the insured.
Similarly, the misguided notion of "full coverage" provides potentially
fertile grounds for litigation. 35 "Full coverage" is a term often used, but
rarely understood by the consumer. Property insurance producers are most
generous in the terminology's usage. When a consumer requests "full
coverage," he typically presumes that the producer will procure insurance
covering any reasonable contingency; however, when a producer uses this
language, he typically intends to say that some level of coverage is provided
in every major area.
The typical automobile insurance policy, for example, contains
coverage for liability resulting from bodily injury inflicted on others,
property damage, injury to passengers, and damage to one's own vehicle.36
The amount of coverage provided in each area can vary quite significantly,
and the cost of such coverage increases as a function of the amount of
coverage obtained. An insured who is involved in an accident, who believes
that he has "full coverage" and has been paying handsome premiums for the
coverage may be surprised to discover that his insurance carrier will pay
only a portion of the claim levied against him. For example, a common
level of coverage for bodily injury is $50,000 per person to a maximum
limit of $100,000 per accident. One could imagine a scenario wherein a
33. See Lake County Grading Co., 589 N.E.2d at 1132.
34. See, e.g., Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239 (Colo.
1987); Cockman v. White, 333 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. App. Ct. 1985); Smith v. R.B. Jones, Inc.,
672 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. App. Ct. 1984); Williams Ins. Agency v. Dee-Bee Contracting Co.,
358 N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1984).
35. But see Gust K. Newberg Constr. Co. v. E.H. Crump, 818 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that a broker had no duty to inform a builder that an "all risk" insurance
policy excluded loss caused by subsurface water, basing the opinion on the builder's lack of
an exclusive business relationship with the broker, the builder's failure to request a peril
analysis, the builder's failure to inform the broker of the subsurface water peril possibility,
and the builder's failure to request insurance to cover this risk).
36. See, e.g., Smith, 672 S.W.2d at 185; Cockman, 333 S.E.2d at 54.
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single plaintiff's personal injury claim totals $100,000, and the aggregate
claims of all plaintiffs total $200,000. The question ultimately becomes
whether "full coverage" is really "full" after all. Obviously, the answer is
that "full coverage" is rarely full as defined by consumer expectation.37
Producer liability is most likely to result where the producer has promised
the insured "full coverage" protection when, in fact, a gap in coverage
existed. 38 Even so, lawmakers and courts have been reluctant to provide
remuneration when the producer promises an insured "full coverage" and the
39
coverage proves insufficient to cover a loss.
B. LIABILITY ARISING FROM AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

An agency relationship is fiduciary in nature.40 Therefore, plaintiffs
invoking agency theory typically allege that the producer acted in the
capacity of an agent and breached a fiduciary duty owed to a principal.4"
The operative determination is identifying the producer's principal.4 2 In
other words, the question is whether the producer owed a fiduciary
obligation to the insurer or the insured. Significantly, a breach of fiduciary
duty is not a tort; therefore, the substantive laws of agency, contract, and
equity control the determination. 43 Under the legislatively-abandoned
agent-broker distinction," an insurance agent more commonly acts in the
capacity of an agent for the insurer, whereas the insurance broker more
typically is viewed as an agent of the insured.45
37. Traditionally, the burden has been placed on the consumer to contemplate and
request the coverage needed, while the producer has been held liable only for the failure to
follow the client's instructions. See, e.g., Robertson v. Krupp Ins. Agency, 260 N.E.2d (Ill.
App. Ct. 1970); Riddle-Duckworth Inc. v. Sullivan, 253 S.E.2d 486 (S.C. 1969).
38. See generally BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 239-40 (1987)
(defining "Personal Automobile Policy").
39. See Gust K. Newberg Constr. Co., 818 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1987).
40. See, e.g., Bayly, Martin & Fay, 739 P.2d at 239.
41. See Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Stewart Smith Intermediaries, Inc., 593 N.E.2d 872,
876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); American Envtl., Inc. v. 3- Co., 583 N.E.2d 649, 655 (I11. App. Ct.
1991); Penrod v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fanner & Smith, Inc., 385 N.E,2d 376, 380 (II1. App.
Ct. 1979).
42. See Kinzer v. City of Chicago, 539 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ill. 1989); Capitol Indem.
Corp. v. Stewart Smith Intermediaries, Inc., 593 N.E.2d at 876.
43. See Kinzer, 539 N.E.2d at 1220; City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 357
N.E.2d 452, 455-57 (Ill. 1976) (holding that restitution is the proper remedy for breach of
fiduciary duty); Capitol Indem. Corp., 593 N.E.2d at 876; Robinson v. LaCasa Grande
Condo. Ass'n, 562 N.E.2d 678 (III. App. Ct. 1990).
44. See supra note 1.
45. See State Sec. Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 630 N.E.2d 940, 940 (Ill. App. Ct.
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Nevertheless, the general rules are not always applicable where the
salesperson's role is not clearly recognizable.46 The nature of the agency
relationship involved is a fact-dependent determination.47 In Zannini v.
Reliance Insurance Company,48 the court set forth factors for determining
whether the insured or the insurer is the producer's principal. 49 The factors
include (1) who originally set the producer into motion; (2) who controlled
the producer's action; (3) who compensated the producer for services
rendered; and (4) whose interest the producer was attempting to protect.5"
In addition, a long-standing friendship or business relationship between the
producer and insured is strong evidence that the insured is the producer's
principal.5
Because it is possible for a producer to serve as an agent for either the
insurer or insured, the producer's position has been described as one of dual
agency.52 Dual agency, however, is a rather unartful means of describing
the producer's role because the terminology contradicts the general agency
law principle that an individual cannot serve as the agent for both parties to
a transaction without the informed consent of both parties.53 In practice,

1994) (stating the proposition explicitly). See also Faulkner v. Gilmore, 621 N.E.2d 908, 911
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Lake County Grading Co. v. Great Lakes Agency, Inc. 589 N.E.2d 1128,
1132 (I11.App. Ct. 1992); Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bassett, 525 N.E.2d 539, 543-44
(IIl. App. Ct. 1988); Browder v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 379 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (111.
App. Ct. 1978); Pittway Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 370 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (I11.
App. Ct. 1977).
46. See Zannini v. Reliance Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 457 (III. 1992); State Sec. Ins. Co.
v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 630 N.E.2d 940 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
47. See, e.g., State Sec. Ins. Co., 630 N.E.2d at 940; Burnhope v. National Mortg.
Equity Corp., 567 N.E.2d 356 (111.App. Ct. 1990). But see Allied Am. Ins. Co. v. Ayala,
App. Ct. 1993) (holding that where the evidence clearly shows
616 N.E.2d 1349, 1361 (111.
that the insured was the producer's principal, the producer is the insured's agent as a matter
of law).
48. 565 N.E.2d 118 (Il. App. Ct. 1990).
49. Id. at 122.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Burke A. Christensen, Fiduciaries Should be Aware of the Differences Between
an Insurance "Agent" and a "Broker" and when those Distinctions Disappear, TR. & EST.,
Sept. 1987, at 55, 56; Marc D. Sherman, Insurance Agent: Dual Agency Role, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., June 1991, at 1.
53. See Restatement (Second) of Agency, §§ 313, 391-92 (1958). See also American
Inc. Corp. v. Sederes, 807 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that the insurance agent
can be the agent of the insurer, insured or both); Ledbetter v. Crudup, 449 N.E.2d 265 (I11.
App. 1983) (recognizing that the agency relationship is affected by the fact-specific dealings
of the parties involved in the transaction); Afinsen Plastic Moulding Co. v. Konen, 386
N.E.2d 108 (II1. App. Ct. 1983) (validating the dual agency relationship where consent is
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producers rarely obtain the requisite disclosure and consent for adopting a
dual agency role.54 The term, dual agency, connotes simultaneous agency
status with two principals. However, at certain severable and identifiable
points in an insurance sales transaction, the producer's status clearly
shifts." The producer represents the insurance company when binding
coverage, collecting premiums, issuing policies, and keeping records.56 On
the other hand, the producer represents the consumer while guiding the
selection of appropriate coverage.57

III. THE CASE

FOR EXPANDED DUTIES TO INQUIRE AND ADVISE

A. THE DECLINE OF THE AGENT-BROKER DISTINCTION

Traditionally, the law has distinguished between an agent and a
broker.58 The distinction concerns the relationship of the parties involved.
It has been said that an agent represents the insurance company, whereas a
broker represents the insured.59 One Illinois appellate court explained the
distinction as follows:
[A]n insurance broker is one who procures insurance and acts as
a middleman between the insured and insurer. The term "insurance agent" refers to a person with a fixed and permanent
relationship to the insurance company. Such [an] agent is
considered to represent the company and has certain duties and
allegiances to that company. 60
The distinction has been significant because, by virtue of his or her
relationship with the client, courts have viewed the broker's role as that of
obtained). Cf. 225 ILCS 455/38.45 (explicitly recognizing the dual agency nature and
conflict of interests involved in the real estate broker's relationships while permitting the real
estate broker to act in a dual agency capacity only where the informed written consent of all

clients is obtained). For further discussion of the dual agency nature of the insurance
producer, see generally Continental Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Cotten, 427 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1970);
Hodges v. Mayes, 242 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. 1978); Southern Guar. Ins. v. Cotton States Mut., 335
S.E.2d 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Dairyland Ins. v. McIntosh, 321 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. Ct. App.
1981); Kersey v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.. 252 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
54. KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 18, at 101.
55. See RONALD T. ANDERSON, AGENTS' LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 38 (1980).

56. Id. at 38-39.
57. Id. at 39.
58. Id. at 28-29.
59. See Christensen supra note 52, at 55.
60. Burnhope v. National Mortg. Equity Corp., 567 N.E.2d 356, 360 (II1. App. Ct.
1990). See Lazzara v. Howard A. Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 1986).
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a fiduciary. 6' Although the distinction seems self-apparent initially, it is
often difficult to distinguish between an agent and a broker because their
activities are so similar.
The agent and the broker both procure insurance policies from
insurance companies for sale to clients. Each is charged with conducting
field underwriting, 62 a process whereby the agent or broker uses objective
and subjective factors to provide an initial risk assessment for consideration
by the home office underwriters. 63 Nevertheless, certain distinctions have
been established that focus upon the producer's employment relationship
with the insurance company. An agent typically represents a particular
65
insurance carrier. 6' In the industry vernacular, the agent is "captive."
In other words, if the insurance customer chooses to purchase insurance
from an agent, the agent will place the business with the single carrier that
he represents.'
On the other hand, a broker is not tied to a particular
61. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Gilmore, 621 N.E.2d 908, 911 (III. App. Ct. 1993); Lake
County Grading Co. v. Great Lakes Agency, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 (II1. App. Ct.
1992); American Envtl., Inc. v. 3- Co., 583 N.E.2d 649, 655 (III. App. Ct. 1991); Shults v.
Griffin-Rahn Ins. Agency, 550 N.E.2d 232, 234 (111.
App. Ct. 1990); Black v. Illinois Fair
Plan Assoc., 409 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980): Kelley v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 748
S.W.2d 54 (Mo. App. Ct. 1988); Kap-Pel Fabrics, Inc. v. R.B. Jones & Sons, Inc., 402
S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App. Ct. 1966).
62. Underwriting is the "process of examining, accepting, or rejecting insurance risks,
and classifying those selected, in order to charge the proper premium for each. The purpose
of underwriting is to spread the risk among a pool of insureds in a manner that is equitable
for the insureds and profitable for the insurer." See BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE
TERMS 345 (1987) (defining "underwriting"). Field underwriting usually consists of
completing answers to questions on a policy application; however, the agent or broker may
also include personal comments regarding the applicant's special needs, character, or any
other relevant factor which may not become apparent from answers to standard policy
application inquiries. Although primary underwriting techniques involve the use of statistics
and other quantifiable measures such as mortality tables, home office underwriters still rely
on the observations of producers when evaluating "exceptional instances." See RICHARDS
ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, § 22, 83-84 (5th ed. 1952).
63. Id.
64. BERTRAM HARNETT, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS, §
2.02[2].
65. Use of the term, captive, to describe the relationship of a producer and an
insurance company is potentially because a producer's authority is not tied by statute to any
one particular company. See 215 ILCS 5/490 et seq. Vernacular use of the term, however,
is probably a residual effect of former licensing requirements tying an agent to a particular
carrier. See HARNETT, supra note 64, at § 2.05. Also, a producer's authority still can be
limited by contract. See 215 ILCS 5/141.02. Furthermore, the term, captive, does enjoy
artful usage in describing certain types of insurance organizations. See 215 ILCS 5/123C-1
et seq.
66. HARNETT, supra note 64, at § 2.02[2].
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company. 67 The broker will place insurance business with a variety of
carriers.68 In comparison to the agent, a broker is more independent.69
In theory, the broker examines the customer's particular insurance
needs and barriers to application approval, such as adverse health conditions,
then he proposes the company that offers the best combination of price and
coverage.7 In practice, however, the distinction between agent and broker
is often thinly drawn. Each agency contract with so-called captive agents
varies in the level of authority granted to the agent to procure insurance and
bind coverage. 71 Although a captive agent places most of his business with
his primary carrier, holds himself out as an agent of that company, and uses
company business cards, logos and letterhead, even a captive agent will
place business with companies other than his primary carrier. These
situations most often include encountering a prospect who poses a specialized risk 72 or where an agent becomes involved in a pricing battle with a
rival carrier. a Furthermore, the proposition that the broker represents the
interests of the client rather than the company is not always accurate.
Although brokers often purport to conduct business with several companies,
they, in fact, often prefer to conduct business with only a handful because
of the higher commissions that these select companies offer.
Many of the insurance companies that have achieved household name
recognition distribute their products exclusively through captive agents over
whom they have a greater degree of control.74 Companies operating
67. Id.
68. Id.; See also WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE, § 78, (B. Anderson,
3d ed. 1951).
69. HARNETr, supra note 64, at § 2.0211].
70. A broker is usually the agent of the insured. See HARNETr, supra note 64, at §
2.02[1]; VANCE, supra note 68, at 443. The broker's relationship as principal to the insured
has firm roots in Illinois law. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Allen, 26 Ill. App. 576
(1888).
71. See HARNETr, supra note 64, at § 2.02[2].
72. Many captive agents represent companies that do not insure substandard risks;
therefore, in order to avoid turning away potential business, the agent will often maintain a
relationship with at least one company that will insure substandard risks. For example, a life
insurance agent may encounter a potential client who has had a history of diabetes. Rather
than refuse to deal with the potential life insurance consumer because his primary company
would reject an application, the agent will place the business with a company that is willing
to insure the risk.
73. Term life insurance rates vary considerably between companies. Consequently,
an agent will often discover that his primary company's term insurance products will not
satisfy the prospect who is looking for the lowest premium available. Rather than lose the
business, the agent will often present a proposal from an alternative carrier. See, e.g., JOSEPH
M. BETH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMER'S HANDBOOK 76 (2d ed. 1985).
74. See 215 ILCS 5/141.02 (specifically contemplating that a producer's authority may
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through captive agents typically pay life insurance commissions ranging
from thirty-five to fifty-five percent of the first year's premium.75 In
comparison, those companies participating in the brokerage market must not
only attract consumers, but they must also induce independent brokers to
sell their products. In order to attract brokers, many insurance companies
offer very high commissions, which sometimes actually exceed one hundred
percent of the first year's premium. Clearly, the lucrative commission
structure offered by many brokerage companies provides a strong incentive
for the broker to consider his own financial interests when deciding which
company to recommend to his sales prospect.
In addition, unscrupulous brokers engage in a practice called "churning," which involves the excessive replacement of insurance contracts
accomplished through the abuse of the client's confidence.76 In other
words, at each policy renewal the broker repeatedly induces the insured to
switch from one insurer to another. The broker benefits from churning by
receiving a first-year commission for each new policy written instead of the
much lower renewal commission that he would earn otherwise. The abuse
is perhaps more common in the property and casualty markets, where
underwriting a new policy is less intrusive 77 and policy replacement is
more commonplace in the ordinary course of business.7
Churning is
possibly most damaging to the insured in the life and health insurance
markets where new administration costs are incurred, accumulated cash
values are surrendered, preexisting conditions can limit coverage under the
new policy, and the insured is subjected to a new incontestability period.79
Quite appropriately, the Illinois legislature has ceded to the notion that
be bound by contract to one or a group of companies).
75. For example, in 1988, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company paid 55% of
the first year premium on whole life products; whereas, it paid 35% on its term life insurance
product. Commission rates are not generally published and available to the public.
76. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (6th ed. 1990) (defining churning).
77. With property and casualty insurance applications, the consumer must merely
answer questions and submit proof of prior insurance coverage; whereas, life and health
insurance applications commonly involve medical exams requiring urine and blood samples.
See IA JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN AND JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 301

(1981).
78. When aproducer endeavors to replace existing life insurance coverage, Illinois law
provides for measures aimed toward protecting the consumer's interests. Among them is a
requirement that the existing insurer receive notice of the intended replacement. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 73 para. 836 (n)(2) (1989).
79. Life and health insurance policies contain an incontestability clause providing that
after a period of time, usually two years, the insurer cannot deny coverage on the basis of
statements made in the application. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "incontestability clause").
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there is little substantive difference between the business conducted by an
agent and a broker. 80 Consequently, it has abandoned the distinction
between agent and broker. Instead, the legislature adopted the term
"producer" in order to more generically describe the individual engaging in
insurance sales activity.8 Nevertheless, the agent-broker distinction is so
entrenched in precedent that Illinois courts have been reluctant to abandon
its use. As a result, the distinction still enjoys some recognition for practical
purposes.
B. THE RISE OF THE INSURANCE PRODUCER AS A POTENTIAL DEFENDANT

As the insurance producer grows in prominence, he becomes an
increasingly viable defendant. In many ways, the development of insurance
producer liability parallels that of pharmacist liability. Traditionally, the
courts have viewed the pharmacist as a mere medicinal retailer.82 As the
pharmacist's role sprang from its humble origins to that of learned
intermediary," courts began to hold pharmacists increasingly accountable
in the products liability chain.8 Today, the pharmacist can expect to stand
alongside the manufacturer as a defendant in products liability lawsuits.8"
Similarly, the insurance producer's role has experienced increasing recognition.86 Rather than merely providing a conduit for over-the-counter policy

80. See 215 ILCS 5/491.1(b) (1993) which eliminates the distinction between agent
and broker and defines "Insurance Producer" as "an individual who solicits, negotiates,
effects, procures, renews, continues or binds policies of insurance covering property or risks
located in Illinois." Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 73 para. 1065.37 (1979) (repealed) which contained
the traditional distinction.
81. See 215 ILCS 5/491.1(b) (1993).
82. See, e.g., David Brushwood, The Informed Intermediary and the Pharmacist's Duty
to Warn, 4 LEGAL MED. Q. 2 (1983) (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger as saying that a
pharmacist "no more renders a true professional service than does a clerk who sells law
books.").
83. See, e.g., Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(framing the pharmacist a vital member of the health care team). See also Brushwood, supra
note 82.
84. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Williams, 374 S.E.2d 438, 440 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that once a pharmacist undertakes to advise a consumer, the pharmacist then has a
duty to advise correctly).
85. See generally McKee v. American Home Products, 782 P.2d 1045 (Wash. 1989);
Docken v. Ciba-Geigy, 739 P.2d 591 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
97 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)1 11,236 (D.D.C. 1986); Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628
F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
86. Liability exposure is not limited to the consumer's direct action against the
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sales, the consumer typically relies upon the producer for advice pertaining
to the appropriateness and adequacy of insurance coverage. Consequently,
the insurance producer is frequently added to the list of named defendants
in actions against insurance companies.87 Yet, the legislature and the
courts have failed to completely recognize the magnitude of the producer's
role.88

producer. Insurance producers frequently find themselves defending lawsuits brought by the
very insurance companies for which they solicit business. See generally Johnson v. Illini
Mut. Ins. Co., 151 N.E.2d 634, 638 (111.
App. Ct. 1958) (holding that an insured need not
first bring suit against the insurer before bringing a cause of action against the agent or
broker). Obviously, insurance companies have decidedly superior sophistication and
resources with respect to negotiating the terms of agency contracts. In fact, very little
negotiation occurs at all. Rather, most companies insist that producers sign adhesion
employment contracts positioning the agent as an independent contractor. As a result, even
where the producer is not named as a party in the original suit, the insurance company will
join the agent as a third party defendant and seek indemnification for its loss. Compare
Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 407 N.E.2d 103 (III. App. Ct. 1980) (where the insurer
sought indemnity from its agent for an amount it had to pay an insured, the court disallowed
the insurer's recovery because the agent's negligent conduct did not cause the insurer to
accept any more risk than it was willing to insure in the first place) with Insurance Co. of
North America v. J.L. Hubbard Co., 318 N.E.2d 289 (III. App. Ct. 1974) (where an insurer
sought indemnity from its agent for an amount it had to pay to an insured, the court
permitted the insurer's recovery because the agent's negligent conduct caused the company
to accept more risk than it was willing to insure). From the agent's perspective, agency
employment contracts often contain a particularly unattractive mix of isolationism and control
over the manner in which the agent conducts business. The company strives to distance itself
from liability exposure by framing the agent as an independent contractor, yet it limits the
agent's autonomy and scrutinizes sales production levels. Many agents are subjected to
periodic contract revisions that rarely favor the agent's position. On occasion, an agent finds
himself divested of accounts that he has developed after many years of service. In one case,
a group of agents instituted a class action lawsuit protesting their company's action. See
Slimack v. Country Life Ins. Co., 591 N.E.2d 70 (III. App. Ct. 1992) (holding for the
insurer).
87. See, e.g., Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bassett, 525 N.E.2d 539 (III. App. Ct.
1988); Black v. Illinois Fair' Plan Ass'n, 409 N.E.2d 549 (111.
App. Ct. 1980).
88. The legislature has not ignored the conflicts of interest that exist in the real estate
market, however. Instead, it has sought to promote stability in the real estate market by
codifying the boundaries of the relationships involved. See 225 ILCS 455/38.5. Accordingly, the Illinois legislature has outlined the duties of licensees such as seeking acceptable
prices and terms, timely presentation of offers, disclosure of material facts, timely accounting
of money and property, obeying the directions of clients, and acting in a manner consistent
with promoting consistent with promoting the client's best interests. See 225 ILCS
455/38.20.
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C. ILLINOIS' FIRST STEPS TOWARD EXPANDED DUTIES: THE DUTY TO INQUIRE

The rule is well established: the producer's primary function is to
obtain coverage according to the client's instructions.8 9 Ordinarily, the
producer can avoid liability by reasonably and faithfully procuring the
coverage in compliance with instructions and by procuring the coverage
requested. 90 But while the great weight of case law deals with the
producer's negligence in procuring the requested insurance coverage, courts
have began to recognize duties arising from the producer's advisory role.
For example, an Indiana court recognized the producer's affirmative
duty to inquire in order to obtain information that enables the producer to
procure adequate coverage. 91 Yet, Illinois courts have stopped short of
finding a broad and general duty to advise.9 2 Instead, the duty to advise
arises when the producer "holds himself out as an insurance specialist,
consultant or counselor and is receiving compensation
for consultation and
93
advice apart from premiums paid by the insured.
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bassett94 provides some insight into
the Illinois approach. In Bassett, the insurer sought a declaratory judgment
89. See Shults v. Griffin-Rahn Ins. Agency, 550 N.E.2d 232, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
Bassett, 525 N.E.2d at 543; Pittway Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 370 N.E.2d 1271,
1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
90. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Of course, the producer can be held
liable for other acts or omissions such as engaging in unauthorized acts, failure to disclose
information, failure to give accurate advice, failure to notify the insured that coverage was
not procured, failure to continue coverage in force, and placement of business with an
insolvent company. See Douglass Hallett et al., Liability of Insurance Agents and Brokers,
in LMGATION 1994, at 519 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 495,
1994).
91. See United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 463 N.E.2d 522, 528 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (basing the duty upon a "long established relationship of entrustment... between
the insured and agent"). See also Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Hitch, 349 N.E.2d 271,
275-76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (limiting the duty to inquire to circumstances where the agent
is put on notice that certain coverages may be necessary).
92. See, e.g., Hosselton v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 603 N.E.2d 96, 97 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the producer has no duty to ascertain the adequacy of the
amount of insurance coverage); Shults v. Griffin-Rahn Ins. Agency, 550 N.E.2d 232, 234-35
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the producer has no duty to advise the insured regarding
the advantages of maintaining Uninsured Motorist coverage at limits higher than those
required by Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 73, para. 755a (1985)).
93. Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 1984).
See also Trotter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. Ct. App.
1988); Kenneth L. Frederick, Court Holds Insurers Have No General Duty To Advise

Insureds, 41 S.C. L. REV. 19 (1988).
94. 525 N.E.2d 539 (Il. App. Ct. 1988).
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to state that the insureds' homeowner's insurance policy excluded liability
coverage for injuries sustained by a child during the operation of a home
day care facility.95 The insureds brought a third party action against the
insurance agency that sold them the policy, basing their claim on the
broker's failure to procure adequate insurance coverage.' While declining
to impute liability to the insurer, the court held that the broker was liable for
the damages incurred.9"
The curious aspects of Bassett relate to the facts which the court used
to support its holding. Neither insured in Bassett had specifically requested
liability coverage for the day care business.9" One insured testified that she
did not discuss her day care business with the producer when applying for
coverage, 99 and she admitted that she had never even read the policy.' °°
In fact she stated, "I just thought the homeowner's [policy] had always
covered for me."' ° Under well-settled principles, these facts alone would
not normally support a decision favoring the producer. As discussed earlier,
the traditional view holds that a producer's primary function is to procure
insurance coverage according to the client's instructions.10 2 In Bassett, the
insureds neither discussed commercial liability coverage nor instructed their
producer to obtain it. In addition, settled "Illinois law clearly places [the]
burden on insureds to know the contents of their policy when it is within
their capabilities to do so. '" 3 The Bassetts did not encounter difficulty
in obtaining or understanding a policy. 4 Instead, they blindly assumed
that adequate coverage was in force. 0 5 Logically, the court must have
based its opinion on other facts.
The Bassett court further based its holding on the producer's admission

95. Id. at 540-41.
96. Id. at 541.
97. Id. at 545.
98. Id. at 544.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
103. Floral Consultants,. Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 N.E.2d 527, 531 (I11.App. Ct.
1984). But see Foster v. Crum and Forster Ins. Co., 345 N.E.2d 49, 51 (111. App. Ct. 1976)
(indicating that the insured is not charged with knowledge of the policy's contents where the
insured has not obtained substitute coverage because an insufficient amount of time has
lapsed).
104. See Bassett, 525 N.E.2d at 539-46 (containing no mention of the plaintiff
experiencing any such difficulties). But cf. Floral Consultants, Ltd., 470 N.E.2d at 529;
Black v. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 409 N.E.2d 549, 553-54 (III. App. Ct. 1980).
105. See Bassett, 525 N.E.2d at 544.
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that he was aware of the insured's business." 6 The producer stated that,
despite his awareness, he never mentioned the possible need for commercial
insurance. 7 For the majority, awareness was enough to impute liability
to the producer;" 8 however, Justice Karns dissented, stating:
The basis of this court's decision is to fashion a rule of law
that an insurance agent has a duty to explore in depth the potential
insurance needs of his clients and offer to procure insurance to
cover potential risks that may be associated with each client,
which presumably will be desired .... We are really imposing a
duty to inquire on insurance agents."
Indeed, Justice Karns' characterization of the majority opinion seems
accurate. Clearly, Bassett places an affirmative duty on the producer to
inquire at least where he has reason to believe that the need for additional
coverage is indicated. 1 ° In comparison, an Indiana court reached a similar
result in Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Hitch,"' indicating that an agent
has a duty to inquire where he is put on notice that certain coverages may
be necessary." 2 Thus, after Bassett, Illinois, like its sister state, Indiana,
seemed well on its way. toward recognizing the need for expanded duties.
Nevertheless, Illinois courts appeared to retreat from further duty
expansions by holding that a producer has no duty to ascertain the adequacy
of the amount of coverage,' 13 or to advise clients that levels of uninsured
motorist coverage are available beyond the statutory minimum levels
required." 4 On the other hand, the post-Bassett case law is distinguishable
because an Illinois statute places the duty on the insurer, rather than the
producer, to inform the insured of available higher coverages." 15 Limiting
the public policy position to cases involving uninsured motorist coverage,
the courts have indicated that burdening the producer with an advisory duty
is duplicitous.' 6 Notably, the Illinois legislature's silence regarding other

106. Id. at 544-45.
107. Id. at 544.
108. Id. at 544-45.
109. Id. at 546 (Karns, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
110. See id. at 544-46.
111. 349 N.E.2d 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
112. Id. at 276.
113. See, e.g., Hosselton v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 603 N.E.2d 96, 97 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (holding in favor of the insurance agency in an action involving the adequacy
of a surety bond).
114. See, e.g., Shults v. Griffin-Rahn Ins. Agency, Inc., 550 N.E.2d 232, 234-35 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
115. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2 (1995) (emphasis added).
116. See Shults, 550 N.E.2d at 235.
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areas of insurance coverage leaves room for the courts to allot advisory roles
to the producer.
Admittedly, the continued viability of the Bassett holding is somewhat
Certainly, Bassett involves a reasonably conservative
questionable.
expansion of duties. Plus, the decision has a counterpart in at least one
sister state jurisdiction," 7 and the court has not rejected or even questioned the holding since the decision was rendered. Yet, the court has not
since clarified its position. Further, the Bassett court failed to mention the
analogous Indiana decision,"18 and the majority opinion failed to specifically recognize any type of duty to inquire by name." 9 Finally, in other
coverage areas, the court has resisted the opportunity to extend producer
duties. 20 Rejecting the Bassett holding, however, is a proposition inconsistent with insurance industry realities.
D. THE SPLIT PERSONALITY OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE FIDUCIARIES
The existing law of producer liability suffers from a divided personality. The Illinois Supreme Court recently described what constitutes a
fiduciary relationship as follows:
A fiduciary relationship exists where there is special confidence
reposed in one who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to
act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one
reposing confidence. It exists where confidence is reposed on one
side and resulting superiority and influence is found on the
other. 12,
By virtue of the principal-agent relationship, the producer often is cast in the
role of the insured's fiduciary.' 22 Yet, the courts have been unwilling to
confer a general duty to advise.' 23 Further, current law24fails to recognize
the confidentiality of the producer-insured relationship.
Nevertheless, recognizing consumer reliance is well-advised in view of
industry practice. For example, a Texas court stated:
A[n] ... agent.., owes his clients the greatest possible duty. He

117. See supra note I I I and accompanying text.
118. See Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bassett, 525 N.E.2d 539 (III. App. Ct. 1988).
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
121. Martin v. Heinold Commodities, 643 N.E.2d 734, 740 (I11.1994) (quoting Kolze
v. Fordtran, 107 N.E.2d 686, 690 (111.1952)) (citations omitted).
122. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
124. See Daugherty v. Blaase, 548 N.E.2d 130, 132 (111.App. Ct. 1989).
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is the one the insured looks to and relies upon. Most people do
not know what company they are insured with. The insured looks
to the agent he deals with to get the coverage he seeks, with a
sound company who can and will properly and promptly pay
claims when they are due. It is his duty to keep his clients fully
125
informed so that they can remain safely insured at all times.
The insured commonly purchases, and the producer commonly binds
coverage, without the insured having ever seen the policy language. 26 In
fact, the insured's first opportunity to read the policy often comes after the
policy is approved and issued by the insurance company's home office
underwriting staff. The underwriting and issuance processes often consume
over thirty days.
In addition, insurance producers themselves willingly engage in conduct
that. induces consumer reliance. As discussed earlier, some insurance
producers mislabel their services as financial advice and planning., 27 But
even those who accurately identify their services often market their products
in a manner that encourages reliance. For example, the producers promote
programs that provide for periodic insurance coverage updates such as the
Farmer's
3°

Friendly

Review, 12

the

PruReview,129

and the

Financial

EKG.
Of course, the ultimate purpose of these programs is to secure
additional insurance sales. Nevertheless, companies and producers typically
induce regular contact with the client by purporting to maintain adequate
levels of protection in all areas. Producers often keep records indicating
possible future insurance needs and current levels of protection. Undoubtedly, the programs aimed toward periodic review are valuable ones; however,
the producer's ability to avoid liability may surprise the consumer who is
attracted by the promise of a thorough periodic review.
Furthermore, producers increasingly hold themselves out as something
more than mere insurance distributors. Rather, they prefer to be counted
among their client's learned advisors.' 31 Indeed, the typical insurance
consumer relies on his producer to guide him through the maze of confusing
125. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Burnette, 560 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)
(quoting Cateora v. British Atlantic Assurance, Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 167, 174 (S.D. Tex. 1968))
(emphasis added).
126. Apparently, recognizing this industry reality, Illinois law provides consumer
protection. See 215 ILCS 224(n) (permitting the insured to surrender a new policy within
ten days of delivery which obligates the insurer to refund all premiums paid).
127. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
128. Promoted by producers affiliated with the Farmers Ins. Grp.
129. Promoted by producers affiliated with the Prudential Ins. & Fin. Serv. Co.
130. Promoted by producers affiliated with the Country Companies Ins. & Inv. Grp.

131. See Christensen, supra note 52, at 56.
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insurance terminology and concepts. One court noted:
[A]n insurance policy is not an ordinary contract. It is a complex
instrument, unilaterally prepared, and seldom understood by the
assured. The same is equally true of the conditional receipt. The
parties are not similarly situated. The company and its representatives are expert in the field; the applicant is not. A court should
not be unaware of this reality and subordinate its significance to
strict legal doctrine.32
Nevertheless, many insurance producers overstep their bounds because they
suffer from an identity crisis. When queried about the manner of their
employment, some insurance producers will respond by asserting that they
are employed as "financial advisors" or "financial planners." 33 The
ambitious and ambiguous labels may serve to boost the insurance producer's
self-esteem, but they do little to deflate the client's magnified expectations.
Finally, current producer liability rules fail to equitably allocate risk of
loss. To most, the insurance industry is filled with arcane concepts and
complex contractual agreements. The producer clearly enjoys a substantially
higher degree of industry savvy than most of his sales prospects. In
addition, errors and omissions policies are available to insulate the producer
from malpractice claims. Yet, under the existing framework, where the
consumer's coverage is inadequate or nonexistent, because the producer
failed to inquire and properly advise, the consumer alone must bear the loss.
A more sensible system would provide a cause of action against the
producer for breach of the duties to inquire and advise. Instead of leaving
the single individual or entity to suffer the loss, the loss would be spread
across a large risk pool. The courts' recognition and expansion of the duties
to inquire and properly advise would not inordinately burden producers. On
the contrary, it would merely require in law what the producers purport to
do in practice. A better informed population of insureds is the greatest
benefit of all.
132. Armstrong v. United Ins. Co. of America, 424 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Iil. App. Ct.
1981) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346, 348 (Nev. 1967)).
133. This malady is especially acute among life insurance producers, especially those
who have obtained a Series 6 license which enables the producer to sell variable insurance
products and mutual funds, but does not permit the sale of other securities such as individual
stocks and bonds. Some agency managers actually encourage producers to market
themselves as "financial advisors" or "financial planners." Of course, this term is most
appropriately used by those who are qualified by virtue of education and training in financial
matters such as lawyers (J.D.s), certified public accountants (C.P.A.s), certified financial
planners (C.F.P.s), or chartered financial consultants (Ch.F.C.s). In any case, the term
"financial advisor" should be reserved for those who do not have commission income at stake
in the transaction on which they are purportedly advising.
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CONCLUSION

The consumer increasingly relies upon the producer for specialized
guidance through an insurance sales transaction. Given the aggressive
marketing strategies and puffing that permeate the industry, the traditional
framework for establishing producer liability is woefully inadequate. The
consumer is forced to bear the risk of inadequate coverage while the
producer is able to escape responsibility despite his markedly greater
sophistication. As a result, the time is ripe for the Illinois legislature and
the courts to correct the inequities by recognizing the duties to inquire and
advise. Quite simply, requiring the producer to thoroughly probe for
liability exposures and coverage inadequacies would properly allocate
responsibility in the insurance sales transaction. The time to recognize the
duties to inquire and properly advise has arrived.

